

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOGADI 01687 01 OF 02 170958Z

11  
ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 L-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 OMB-01 MC-02 EUR-25

ACDA-19 DRC-01 /121 W  
----- 020981

R 170602Z NOV 73  
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1424  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 1687

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: US SO ET PFOR PBOR MCAP

SUBJ: ETHIOPIAN SECURITY

REF: KHARTOUM 2432 (FROM NEWSOM)

1. THIS MESSAGE GIVES WHAT WE BELIEVE SOMALI REACTIONS MIGHT BE TO ALTERNATIVE US POLICIES TOWARD ETHIOPIA OUTLINED REFTTEL.
2. IRRIDENTISM IS BASIC TO PRESENT SOMALI REGIME. IT IS FELT DEEPLY BY MOST IN RULING GROUP, SEVERAL OF WHOM HAVE FAMILY TIES IN ETHIOPIA. IT IS VERY USEFUL MEANS OF JUSTIFYING CONTINUED MILITARY RULE. IT PERMITS FUNNELING OF SUBSTANTIAL RESOURCES TO ARMED FORCES. IT HAS REAL APPEAL TO SOMALI MASSES. POLITICAL "SOLUTION" TO SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, SHORT OF UNEXPECTED ETHIOPIAN CESSION OF EXTENSIVE LANDS, IS THUS PROBABLY NOT IN CARDS UNDER PRESENT SOMALI GOVERNMENT.
3. WE DOUBT GSDR WILL ATTEMPT RESOLVE DISPUTE BY FORCE IN NEAR FUTURE, ASSUMING (AS WE DO) THAT THEY DO NOT RECEIVE LARGE NEW ARMS SHIPMENTS WHICH TIP MILITARY BALANCE SO FAR THAT THEY COULD OVERSHELM ETHIOPIANS WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY.
  - A. IN ABSENCE SUCH DRASTIC ALTERNATION OF BALANCE OF FORCES, SOMALIS CANNOT BE CONFIDENT MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE SUCCESS-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOGADI 01687 01 OF 02 170958Z

FUL; THEY FEEL EMPEROR NO LONGER MAJOR FORCE FOR COMPROMISE;

AND THEY BELIEVE THAT NEXT FEW YEARS WILL BRING INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ETHIOPIA WHICH MIGHT WELL PROVIDE BETTER SETTING FOR SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL AND/OR MILITARY ACTION TO ACQUIRE OGADEN.

B. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO MILITATE AGAINST EARLY ACTION. SOMALIS FEEL SOMEWHAT ISOLATED IN AFRICA AND ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO FACT OAU SUMMIT IS SCHEDULED TO MEET IN MOGADISCIO THIS JUNE. THEY KNOW MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ETHIOPIA WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE PREAMBLE TO THAT MEETING, ESPECIALLY AS OAU GOOD OFFICES COMMITTEE IS CURRENTLY SEIZED OF DISPUTE. THEY MAY HAVE INCREASED DOUBTS ABOUT HELP THEY WOULD GET FROM ARABS IF HOSTILITIES OCCURRED IN OGADEN IN VIEW RECENT ETHIOPIAN BREAK WITH ISRAEL.

C. SOMALIS WILL BE LESS INHIBITED FROM TAKING MILITARY ACTION AFTER OAU SUMMIT, PARTICULARLY IF SUMMIT MAKES LITTLE PROGRESS TOWARD LESSENING SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN TENSIONS AND IF SOMALIS HAVE IN MEANTIME RECEIVED SOME MORE SOVIET ARMS. HOWEVER, SIAD HAS JUST PROCLAIMED 1974 "YEAR OF THE ECONOMY", AND GOVERNMENT SHOWS SIGNS OF WISHING TO USE THIS YEAR TO GRAPPLE WITH SOME OF ENORMOUS DEVELOPMENTAL CHALLENGES FACING IT. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS MENTIONED IN (A) ABOVE WILL PUSH SOMALIS TOWARD USING LIMITED MEANS TO KEEP PRESSURE ON IEG - OAU, SUPPORT OF ELF, ETC. - BIDDING THEIR TIME UNTIL INTERNAL SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA APPEARS MORE PROPITIOUS.

4. WITH THIS BACKGROUND, WHAT WOULD BE SOMALI REACTION TO INCREASE IN SOPHISTICATION OR QUANTITY OF US DELIVERIES TO EHTIOPIA (ROUGHLY FIRST FOUR ALTERNATIVES REFTEL)?

A. WHILE EVEN MODERATE INCREASE IN SUCH DELIVERIES WILL ANGER SOMALIS, WE DOUBT THEY WOULD TAKE ACTION AGAINST US OR REAL SIGNIFICANCE TO US. SOMALIS CONVINCED US HAS EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE IN ADDIS AND MAY FEEL THEIR BEHAVIOR TOWARD US COULD AFFECT NATURE OF ADVICE WE GIVING ETHIOPIANS. THE VERY LIMITED US DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN SOMALIA IS GOOD FOR SOMALI SELF-ESTEEM. IT HOLDS OUT HOPE OF RENEWAL OF US AID AT SOME FUTURE TIME. ONLY US COMMERCIAL PRESENCE OF ANY SIZE, IN OIL EXPLORATION, IS AT STAGE WHERE COMPANIES ARE PUTTING MONEY INTO SOMALIA RATHER THAN TAKING IT OUT, AND SOMALIA HAS CONSIDERABLE STAKE IN IT SREPUTATION WITHIN OIL COMPANY COMMUNITY. SOMALIS CAPABLE OF ACTING AGAINST OIL COMPANIES DESPITE THIS, BUT THEY WOULD THINK TWICE BEFORE DOING SO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOGADI 01687 01 OF 02 170958Z

B. SOMALI FRUSTRATION AND CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY OF EHTIOPIAN MILITARY ACTION WOULD RISE, BUT, ASSUMING ARMS SUPPLY HANDLED IN RELATIVELY NON-PROVOCATIVE MANNER, CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED IN PARA. 3 ABOVE WOULD PROBABLY STILL DISSUADE SOMALIS FROM PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE.

C. SOMALIS WOULD PROBABLY DIVERT EVEN MORE RESOURCES INTO MILITARY FIELD, THUS FURTHER HANDICAPPING THEIR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

D. SOMALIS WOULD OF COURSE FEEL GREATER NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER ARMS FROM SOVIETS, THUS GIVING LATTER OPPORTUNITY TO EXACT MORE FROM SOMALIA. YET WE QUESTION WHETHER SOVIETS FEEL NEED FOR MANY ADDITIONAL MILITARY FACILITIES HERE. THEY MIGHT WANT MORE FORMAL TIES - A FRIENDSHIP TREATY, FOR INSTANCE. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS TO US SOVIETS WOULD NOT WANT A RELATIONSHIP SO CLOSE THAT THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOMALIA'S WELFARE. THEY MIGHT WELL SEEK A MORE INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN SHAPING SOMALI INTERNAL POLICIES IN WAYS THEY THINK WILL BETTER ASSURE PERMANENCE OF CURRENT REGIME OR ITS REPLACEMENT BY ONE AT LEAST AS FRIENDLY TO THEM BUT WITH MORE SOLID POLITICAL BASE. THEY MIGHT SEEK TO LESSEN SOMALI COOPERATION WITH PRC. THEY MIGHT ASK SOMALIA TO HEW EVEN MORE CLOSELY TO SOVIET LINE IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, OR TO DISTANCE ITSELF FURTHER FROM US.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOGADI 01687 02 OF 02 200757Z

12

ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 L-03

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DRC-01 DODE-00 OMB-01 MC-02

EUR-25 ACDA-19 AID-20 EA-11 IGA-02 TRSE-00 IO-14 EB-11

/179 W

----- 036907

R 170602Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1425

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 2 MOGADISCIO 1687

E. INCREASE IN SOMALI WILLINGNESS TO ACCEDE TO SOVIET DESIRES WOULD DEPEND ON NATURE AND HANDLING OF INCREASED US SHIPMENTS TO ETHIOPIA, BUT SOMALIS ARE INDEPENDENT-MINDED PEOPLE WHO ALREADY RESENT SOVIET HIGH-HANDEDNESS.

F. WE DO NOT BELIEVE MODERATE INCREASE IN US SHIPMENTS HANDLED IN UNPROVOCATIVE FASHION WOULD BRING QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN SOMALIA-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, THOUGH IT MIGHT LEAD TO SOMEWHAT MORE WELL-ENTRENCHED SOVIET POSITION.

5. SOMALI REACTION TO CESSATION OF US GRANT MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ETHIOPIA (REFTEL ALTERNATIVE E):

A. THIS WOULD CHEER SOMALIS, BUT, ASSUMING IT DID NOT SEVERELY DESTABILIZE ETHIOPIAN INTERNAL SCENE, WE DOUBT SOMALIS WOULD FEEL IT CREATED SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR MAJOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ETHIOPIA.

B. SUCCESSFUL ETHIOPIAN QUEST FOR ALTERNATIVE ARMS SOURCES IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT CURRENT (AND WELCOME) SOMALI DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY ITALY. SOME OF SOMALI RESENTMENT WOULD FALL ON US, ON GROUNDS WEST EUROPEANS ACTING AS OUR SURROGATE IN AIDING ETHIOPIA. EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO SPECIFIC EUROPEAN INTERESTS WOULD BE LIMITED BY FACT THAT STAKE OF THESE COUNTRIES (WITH EXCEPTION OF ITALY) IN SOMALIA IS QUITE SMALL AND FACT SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOGADI 01687 02 OF 02 200757Z

THAT SOMALIS WOULD NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE EUROPEAN AID TO SOMALIA (THROUGH FED, FOR EXAMPLE).

C. IF USSR GAVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIANS, SOMALIS WOULD COMPLAIN TO SOVIETS BUT, ASSUMING TYPES AND QUANTITIES LIMITED, WE DO NOT THINK THEY WOULD UNDERTAKE A RADICAL SHIFT IN ALIGNMENT. SOMALIS MIGHT TRY TO REDUCE SOVIET HOLD ON THEIR GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY MACHINERY, BUT THEY WOULD HESITATE TO TAKE STEPS WHICH MIGHT JEOPARDIZE ARMS FLOW FROM USSR TO SOMALIA, UNLESS THEY HAD WHAT THEY CONSIDERED ADEQUATE ASSURED SUPPLY FROM ELSEWHERE.

D. PRC SUPPLY OF ARMS TO ETHIOPIA WOULD SPOIL LUSTROUS PRC IMAGE HERE. HOWEVER, PRC PRESENCE IS IMPORTANT TO SOMALIA AS BALANCE TO SOVIETS, AND IT WOULD NOT BE IN SOMALIA'S INTEREST TO CURB PRC'S HELPFUL AID PROJECTS.

6. SOMALI REACTION TO INTENSIFIED EFFORTS TO LESSEN SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN TENSIONS (REFTEL ALTERNATIVE F):

A. AS NOTED IN PARA. 2 ABOVE, BASIC SOMALI AMBITIONS WILL NOT BE SATISFIED BY LIMITED COMPROMISE MEASURES.

B. TROOP SEPARATION PRESENTS PROBLEM FOR SOMALIS IN THAT NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SOMALI MILITARY AND POPULATION CENTERS ARE RELATIVELY CLOSE TO BORDER, E.G., BELET UEN, HARGEISA. FURTHERMORE, PULL-BACK AN AGREED DISTANCE FROM DE FACTO BORDER COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ENHANCING STATUS OF THAT DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. IN ADDITION, SOMALIS CLAIM THAT IT WAS FORWARD MOVEMENT OF ETHIOPIAN FORCES WHICH AGGRAVATED SITUATION AND THEREFORE ARGUE THAT ANY PULL-BACK SHOULD BE DEEPER ON ETHIOPIAN SIDE. HOWEVER, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF SOMALI AGREEMENT TO MODEST MUTUAL PULL-BACK (10-20 KILOMETERS). IF IT APPEARS ETHIOPIANS COULD ACCEPT THIS, WE MIGHT ENCOURAGE CURRENT OAU EFFORTS TO THIS END.

C. GSDR HAS TO DATE BEEN VERY HOSTILE TO ECONOMIC COLLA-

BORATION WITH "THE ENEMY", AND WE THINK THIS POLICY WILL CONTINUE. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF ANY SCHEMES WHICH MIGHT IMPLY SOMALI RECOGNITION OF ETHIOPIAN JURISDICTION OVER OGADEN. THUS, WE DOUBT VERY MUCH SOMALIS WOULD AGREE TO EMINENTLY SENSIBLE PLAN OF EVACUATING OIL AND GAS FROM ETHIOPIAN WELLS IN OGADEN THROUGH SOMALIA. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE RENEWED EFFORTS TOWARD COOPERATION IN MORE NEUTRAL FIELDS SUCH AS TRADE, AIR AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, BUT EVEN HERE PAST RECORD IS DISCOURAGING

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOGADI 01687 02 OF 02 200757Z

AND PROGRESS LIKELY BE VERY SLOW. INDEED, WE FEAR ECONOMIC COOPERATION WILL LAG BEHIND, NOT INDUCE, IMPROVEMENTS IN POLITICAL CLIMATE UNDER PRESENT SOMALI REGIME.

KIRK

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMS SHIPMENTS, DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 17 NOV 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973MOGADI01687  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** MOGADISCIO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731127/aaaaatpa.tel  
**Line Count:** 241  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION AF  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** KHARTOUM 2432 (FROM NEWSOM)  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 09 JAN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <09-Jan-2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <29-Jan-2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ETHIOPIAN SECURITY  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PBOR, MCAP, US, SO, ET  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005